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In Lafler v. Cooper1 and Missouri v. Frye,2 the Supreme Court
recognized the obvious: the criminal justice system is ‘‘for
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.’’3
Very few criminal cases—less than three percent—go to
trial. The rest are resolved through some form of a guilty
plea.4 As scholars have noted, plea bargaining ‘‘is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system, it is the criminal
justice system.’’5 Given the centrality of plea bargaining in
the current criminal justice system, the Court recognized
that ‘‘the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the
unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for
a defendant.’’6 Because of this ‘‘new normal,’’ the Court
concluded that a criminal defendant’s trial counsel has
‘‘responsibilities in the plea bargain process . . . that must
be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the
Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical stages.’’7
In Frye, the Court held that defense counsel have ‘‘the
duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to
accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable
to the accused.’’8 It then concluded that that counsel’s
failure to do so was deficient performance under its wellestablished Strickland standard for adjudicating ineffective
assistance of counsel claims,9 and remanded to the state
court to determine whether the failure to communicate the
offer was prejudicial, that is, whether there was a ‘‘reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process
would have been more favorable by reason of a plea offer to
a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.’’10 In
Lafler, decided the same day as Frye, trial counsel advised
the client to turn down a plea bargain based on an erroneous understanding of the law. At trial, the defendant was
convicted and given a sentence three and one half times
greater than he would have received under the plea.
Therefore, it was conceded that counsel’s performance was
deficient.11 However, the Court rejected the state’s argument that Cooper could not show prejudice because he was
found guilty by a jury after a fair trial. It did so reasoning
that ‘‘the question is not the fairness or reliability of the trial
but the fairness and regularity of the processes that preceded it, which caused the defendant to lose benefits he
would have received in the ordinary course but for counsel’s ineffective assistance.’’12 The Court then held that

ineffective assistance under Strickland had been satisfied
and remanded to order for the state to re-offer the pretrial
plea bargain.
Justice Scalia noted in dissent that the Court has opened
‘‘a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea bargaining law.’’13 And, at least to that extent,
Justice Scalia is clearly correct. In the years to come, courts
will inevitably be required to resolve a number of issues
related to trial counsel’s Sixth Amendment responsibilities
to their clients during plea bargaining. In this short essay, I
will discuss one issue of considerable importance to the
criminal justice system, and one that has received little
attention by courts or scholars: What are trial counsel’s
responsibilities when the prosecution offers a plea to life (or
less) in cases where a defendant is facing the death penalty?
Like other criminal offenses, most death-eligible murder cases are resolved through guilty pleas. Some readers
will be surprised to learn, however, that a very substantial
percentage of the current population of death row—some
estimate the number to be as high as seventy percent of the
inmates14—refused to accept a plea bargain that would have
spared their lives.15 After rejecting the prosecution’s offer,
most of these defendants went to trial, were found guilty at
the guilt-or-innocence phase of the proceedings, and then
were sentenced to death following a penalty hearing. Some
had their convictions or sentences reversed at some point
during the capital appeals process, but some were executed.
In many of these cases, however, reasonably effective
defense counsel would have persuaded the client to accept
the plea.
I do not mean to suggest that it is per se unreasonable to
fail to persuade a client to accept a plea bargain that will
spare his or her life. The DNA exoneration cases, for
example, have established that some capital defendants
who refused to plead guilty and who were then convicted
and sentenced to death were, in fact, innocent.16 However,
in many of the death penalty cases in which defendants
rejected life offers, there was no, or virtually no, chance that
the defendant would be acquitted.17 Furthermore, given the
nature of the offense, the defendant’s prior record, and
other aggravating evidence, it was certainly possible, if not
probable, that the jury would sentence the defendant to
death. Thus the ‘‘deal’’ that the prosecution was offering—
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a guilty plea in exchange for a life sentence—represented in
many cases either the most likely trial outcome or, from the
defendant’s perspective, the best possible trial outcome.18
If that is true, why don’t many capital defendants accept
a plea offer when it is in their best interest to do so?
Interviews with experienced capital defense lawyers indicate several recurring reasons why capital clients reject
favorable plea bargains: (1) the defendant does not trust his
court-appointed counsel; (2) the defendant has (often significantly) underestimated the strength of the prosecution’s
case and/or likelihood of conviction at trial; (3) the defendant is too ashamed to admit his or her guilt to family and
friends; and (4) the client’s decision making is impaired by
intellectual deficits, mental illness, and/or the stress of
a pending capital trial. In some, if not many, cases, it is
a combination of these reasons. But the same conversations
with skilled capital trial lawyers also establishes that many,
if not most, clients facing the ultimate punishment, can be
persuaded to accept a plea offer when it is in their best
interest to do so. Persuasion can often be a time-consuming
and labor-intensive process, and it may require the defense
team to enlist the assistance of others (e.g., the client’s
relatives, mental health professionals, inmates who
accepted similar plea bargains), but reasonably competent
counsel can in most cases convince a client that the substantial downside risks weigh against ‘‘rolling the dice’’ at
trial.19 And it is certainly never reasonable for trial counsel
for a capitally charged client to accept the client’s initial
rejection of a plea offer as ending the discussion.20
Given the number of cases in which people who rejected
plea offers were sentenced to death, there have been
remarkably few claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to persuade their client to accept
the offered plea.21 Regardless of the reasons for the dearth
of litigation challenging counsel’s lack of success in convincing a client to accept a favorable offer pre-Lafler and
Frye,22 that will almost certainly change in the future, given
the Supreme Court’s recognition in those decisions that the
negotiation of a favorable plea bargain is the ‘‘critical point’’
for most defendants and that defense counsel have
‘‘responsibilities in the plea bargain process . . . that must
be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the
Sixth Amendment requires.’’23
The early evidence also suggests this is an area courts
will be forced to confront. Since the Court’s decision in
Lafler and Frye, there have been four reported decisions in
which death-sentenced inmates alleged ineffective assistance of counsel arising from trial counsel’s failure to persuade them to accept a favorable plea bargain in a capital
case. Three of the four decisions either assume without
deciding or explicitly acknowledge that trial counsel in
a capital case have a Sixth Amendment obligation to
attempt to persuade their client to accept a plea bargain
which would spare their lives.24 In State v. Fry, the Ohio
Supreme Court assumed without deciding that counsel’s
performance was deficient for failing to enlist the defendant’s family members to assist in convincing the

defendant to accept a plea to life.25 And in Overstreet v.
Wilson, a panel of the Seventh Circuit assumed, again
without deciding, that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions require counsel in a capital case not only to convey the
offer, but to do so effectively.26 In both cases, the courts
rejected the claim because the defendants failed to show
prejudice.
The most detailed post-Frye and Lafler discussion of this
emerging issue is found in Johnson v. United States, a collateral challenge to a federal death sentence.27 The petitioner in Johnson raised, among other claims, several
challenges to counsel’s performance in failing to persuade
her to plead guilty in exchange for the government withdrawing the death penalty as a sentencing option. One
claim centered around the fact that counsel spent little time
explaining to Ms. Johnson the strength of the government’s
case against her; rather, the only team member who spent
any substantial amount of time with the client was a paralegal, who blindly accepted Ms. Johnson’s protestations of
innocence. Thus, the defense team failed to speak with
a unified voice, and they failed to enlist assistance from
Johnson’s family and friends to persuade her to accept the
plea bargain. The District Court was clearly bothered by
counsel’s inactivity:
I find it very troubling that trial counsel were unable
to present Johnson with a unified message that her
only realistic course was to accept a plea agreement
to life imprisonment; that they did not spend more
time with Johnson, and sooner, discussing plea
options; that they did not do more, and sooner, to
marshal and confront Johnson with evidence suggesting that a plea to a life sentence was the only
realistic option; and that they did not do more, and
sooner, to enlist the aid of family members and
others to convince her to plead guilty to the charges
in order to escape the death penalty.28
However, the court was not persuaded that counsel’s
performance was outside the wide range of competent
assistance.
Nevertheless, the District Court did find objectively
unreasonable counsel’s continued attempts to persuade the
government to accept a term of years (as opposed to a life
sentence) after Ms. Johnson’s codefendant was sentenced
to death.29 However, the court ultimately concluded that
trial counsel’s deficient performance was not prejudicial
given Johnson’s pretrial protestations of innocence and the
corresponding lack of objective evidence that Johnson
would have accepted such a plea offer.30
Despite the fact that Johnson’s guilty plea claims failed31
(as did the claims in the other cases discussed above), there
are several reasons that counsel who represent deathsentenced inmates should be at least (modestly) encouraged by the decision as a potential harbinger of better
things to come. First, Johnson is the first decision in the
death penalty context that found trial counsel’s performance to be deficient during the plea bargaining phase of
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a capital trial representation. In doing so, the court relied
heavily upon the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Lafler
and Frye.32 Second, given Lafler and Frye’s clear statement
that in the current world of pleas not trials, counsel have
‘‘responsibilities in the plea bargain process . . . that must
be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the
Sixth Amendment requires,’’ and given the widely recognized norm in the capital defense bar that reasonably
competent trial counsel can frequently persuade even the
most reluctant capitally charged client to accept a favorable
plea offer, it would seem to be only a matter of time before
a judge is faced with a set of facts that warrant a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376.
By ‘‘some form of guilty plea,’’ I am referring to both negotiated
pleas as well as ‘‘straight up’’ pleas where the client pleads
guilty hoping for a more lenient sentence than would otherwise
be obtained, and also to nolo contendere pleas and Alford pleas
(one in which the client pleads guilty but expressly asserts her
innocence).
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 Yale L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992).
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. Despite the many critiques of plea
bargaining in the academic literature, the Court had no such
reservations about the practice. Justice Kennedy stated: ‘‘To
note the prevalence of plea bargaining is not to criticize it. The
potential to conserve valuable judicial resources and for
defendants to admit their crimes and receive more favorable
terms at sentencing means that a plea agreement can benefit
both parties.’’ Id. Justice Scalia responded in dissent: ‘‘we have
plea bargaining a-plenty but until today it has been regarded as
a necessary evil. . . . Today, however, the Supreme Court of the
United States elevates plea bargaining from a necessary evil to
a constitutional entitlement.’’ Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
Id.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland
established a two-prong test for assessing whether a criminal
defendant was provided with the effective assistance of counsel. Prong one, often referred to as the deficient performance
prong, asks whether counsel’s performance was objectively
reasonable under all the circumstances (or whether it was
outside the wide range of competent assistance). Prong two,
commonly referred to as the prejudice prong, asks whether
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome would have been different.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409.
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391.
Id. at 1387.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Case:
The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 323, 371
(1993).
I leave for another day the issue of whether reasonably effective
defense counsel could have persuaded the prosecution to offer
a life sentence in exchange for a guilty plea in cases where there
was no life offer. However, as recent events have demonstrated,
excellent lawyers can negotiate a life sentence even in cases
that appear to be ‘‘unwinnable.’’ See, e.g., Richard A. Serrano,
Jared Loughner Pleads Guilty to Killing 6 in Tucson Shooting, L.A.
Times, Aug. 7, 2012, available at http://www.latimes.com/
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news/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-jared-loughner-plead-guilty20120807,0,1931406.story (discussing Jared Loughner’s
guilty plea to life without parole for the murder of, inter alia,
a federal judge and a young child, and for intending to kill
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords).
In other cases, defendants facing the ultimate punishment pled
guilty to crimes they did not commit in order to avoid the possibility of being sentenced to death. See John H. Blume &
Rebecca Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼2103787.
The prospects of acquittal are further diminished by the fact
that juries in capital cases are ‘‘death qualified,’’ i.e., people
whose views on capital punishment would impair their ability to
follow the law are not eligible to serve on a jury where the death
penalty is a sentencing option. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985). A well-established body of social science research has
demonstrated that such juries are more ‘‘conviction prone’’
than non–death qualified juries. See, e.g., William Thompson,
Claudia Cowen, Phoebe Ellsworth, & Joan Harrington, Death
Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of
Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 Law & Hum. Behavior 95 (1984).
For example, Ted Bundy, the infamous serial killer, was offered,
and initially accepted, a plea bargain that would have avoided
the death penalty. He refused to go through with the ‘‘deal,’’
and it was withdrawn. He was then tried, convicted, sentenced
to death, and ultimately executed.
The client’s resistance is often symptomatic of larger problems
in the attorney-client relationship, the most common of which
is that trial counsel has failed to spend sufficient time with the
client and/or sufficient time investigating the case to obtain the
client’s trust. The American Bar Association’s Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, which have been relied upon by the Supreme Court
in numerous cases as shedding light on the appropriate standard of care, see, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387
(2005), state that ‘‘[c]ounsel at all stages of the case should
make every appropriate effort to establish a relationship of
trust with the client, and should maintain contact with the client,’’ Guideline 10.5.A, and that ‘‘[c]ounsel at all stages should
engage in a continuing interactive dialogue with client concerning . . . : 1. the factual investigation . . . ; 3. the development
of a defense theory; . . . 5. potential agreed-upon dispositions of
the case . . . ,’’ Guideline 10.5.C. See also Russell Stetler,
Commentary on Counsel’s Duty to Seek and Negotiate a Disposition in Capital Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 157, 1157 (2003); Rick
Kammen & Lee Norton, Plea Agreements: Working with Capital
Defendants, the Advocate, March 2000, available at http://
www.e-archives.ky.gov/pubs/Public_Adv/mar00/plea.html.
See ABA Guideline 10.9.1, ‘‘The duty to seek an agreed-upon
disposition,’’ which states: ‘‘(A) Counsel at every stage of the
case have an obligation to take all steps that may be appropriate in the exercise of professional judgment . . . to achieve an
agreed-upon disposition. . . . (E) . . . a client’s . . . opposition
should not prevent counsel from engaging in an ongoing effort
to persuade the client to accept an offer of resolution that is in
the client’s best interest.’’
In fact, prior to Frye and Lafler, I found only one decision
involving such a claim in a capital case. In Jones v. Murray, 947
F. 2d 1106 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit rejected a death
sentenced inmate’s claim that trial counsel’s failure to persuade the defendant to accept the prosecution’s twoconsecutive-life-term offer was unreasonable. Counsel had
indicated that he explained the offer to his client, but
acknowledged that he did not attempt to convince his client to
accept it, even though he believed there was more than
a seventy percent chance of conviction and a fifty percent
chance of a death sentence. The court held that given the
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client’s stated reason for rejecting the offer, i.e., that he was
innocent, ‘‘to refrain from a vigorous attempt to change his
client’s mind’’ was not unreasonable. Id. at 1111. There are
a small handful of capital cases involving claims challenging
counsel’s advice to reject a plea offer, but those are not the
focus of this article. I focus here on cases where trial counsel
was either ‘‘neutral’’ or advised the client that he should accept
the plea offer.
The dearth of claims is probably explained by a combination of
factors including: uncertainty prior to Lafler and Frye about
whether plea bargaining was a ‘‘critical stage’’ of the proceedings to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel (and thus
the right to the effective assistance of counsel) applied; a widely
held belief that the client’s autonomy interests counsel against
attempting to ‘‘coerce’’ the client into accepting a plea he is
resistant to accepting; and difficulties—but not insurmountable ones—inherent in attempting to prove a ‘‘what if’’ counterfactual scenario.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
The fourth decision was decided in the federal habeas corpus
context. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
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Circuit held that a state court determination that trial counsel
has no duty to convince a defendant to take a plea was not
objectively unreasonable and thus the petitioner was not entitled to relief in light of 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Gissendaner v.
Seabolt, 2012 WL 2062398 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
State v. Fry, 2012 WL 2128027 (Ohio 2012).
Overstreet v. Wilson, 2012 WL 2829296 (7th Cir. 2012).
Johnson v. United States, 2012 WL 1836282 (N.D. Iowa 2012).
Id. at 84.
Id. (‘‘The performance in plea negotiations that I do find deficient was their continued push for an agreement to a sentence
for a term of years, once a plea to a term of years became both
wholly unrealistic and wholly unreasonable as a bargaining
position.’’).
Id. at 87, 88.
Johnson did prevail, however, on other grounds, i.e., trial
counsel’s presentation of mental health evidence was both
deficient and prejudicial. Because the government cannot
appeal a grant of postconviction relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§2255, Johnson will receive a new sentencing trial.
Id. at 80.
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